Physical Security at Federal Facilities

12/17/2013

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and distinguished members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for allowing me to provide comments on federal employee workplace safety and security. As President of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I have the honor of representing over 150,000 federal workers in 31 federal agencies and departments.

Mr. Chairman, recent events including shootings at the Washington Naval Yard and Los Angeles

Airport have once again raised concerns about the vulnerability of federal buildings and the safety and security of federal employees who work in them around the country. These attacks serve as a grim reminder of the great risk that federal employees face each and every day in service to this country, and have further heightened ongoing concerns by many federal employees that current safety and security standards at many federal facilities are insufficient.

FEDERAL BUILDING SECURITY

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the responsibility for ensuring the physical safety of federal employees who work in roughly 9,600 federally owned and leased facilities is given to the Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security. Part of that responsibility also includes ensuring the security of U.S. citizens who visit many of the federal workplaces. On any given day, there can be well over one million people who are tenants of, and visitors to, federal worksites nationwide.

Unfortunately, recent congressional testimony by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) raises concerns that government employees and members of the public are still not receiving the proper level of protection from the FPS. In particular, NTEU believes that inadequate funding, staffing and training at the FPS, as well as a continued over-reliance on outside contractors, have severely hampered its ability to carry out its core missions to protect facilities, to complete building security assessments in a timely and professional manner, and to monitor and oversee contract guards.

In addition to inadequate staffing and funding, NTEU is greatly concerned that FPS’ overreliance on the use of contract security guards has severely hampered its ability to adequately protect federal facilities. Of particular concern is a September 2013 GAO investigation on the

operational and management challenges facing the FPS which found that federal employees, buildings and visitors may be at risk due to unqualified contract guards who were also lacking proper certifications and training. The study found that a large number portion of FPS’ contract guard force lacks basic firearms, and screener training and many have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Additionally, the report found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure its guards have met its training and certification requirements. For instance, although FPS agreed with GAO’s 2010 and 2012 recommendations that it develop a comprehensive and reliable system for managing information on guards’ training, certifications, and qualifications, the report found that it still does not have such a system.

It is clear that FPS’ excessive reliance on the use of outside contractors and inability to monitor the contract workforce continues to erode its’ ability to carry out its core mission of protecting federal facilities and effectively monitoring its contract security guard workforce.

In light of the many problems associated with FPS’ continuing use and overreliance on its roughly 13,500 contract security workforce, NTEU strongly believes that Congress should consider in-sourcing contract guard positions at high risk facilities located around the country. Replacing contract guards who lack law enforcement authority at these facilities with Federal Police Officers that possess the full authority and training to perform traditional police functions, and restricting contract guards to solely providing monitoring functions at lower risk facilities, will ensure FPS is better able to protect federal facilities and the employees within them.

SECURITY AT THE IRS

Mr. Chairman, as the Federal inventory of buildings has steadily increased over the last 30 years, the uniformity and implementation of security standards have varied greatly. Prior to 1995, minimum physical security standards did not exist for nonmilitary federally owned or leased facilities. But even with established minimum safety standards, security at federal facilities can vary greatly from agency to agency and even from building to building.

This is particularly true for agencies like the IRS, which must offer public access to provide customer service. The IRS is widely dispersed with employees located in over 670 facilities throughout the nation. These facilities can range from one-person offices to large tax return processing campuses with thousands of employees. There are also different tenant sharing arrangements at these facilities, from being housed as an IRS-only office to sharing building space with other Federal agencies and other private companies. In buildings where the IRS is not the lead agency or tenant (i.e., the largest organization in the building) the IRS must propose changes through a building security committee.

NTEU members have consistently voiced concern over the inconsistency of safety and security measures at IRS facilities across the county, and recent report from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) highlights these concerns.

The report identified significant deficiencies in the IRS’s Physical Security Risk Assessment Program and found that all facilities did not receive risk assessments as required. In particular, the IRS did not complete risk assessments at 14 of their facilities, and could not provide evidence that risk assessments were performed for the 49 facilities that are the responsibility of the FPS.

In addition, the report found some of the completed risk assessments that identified additional security countermeasures needed at IRS facilities had not been acted upon, including implementation of blast mitigation countermeasures at approximately 191 facilities, and additional security guard presence at certain Taxpayer Assistance Centers (TACs).

As a result, the report noted the IRS may have security vulnerabilities that are not identified and addressed in a timely manner, thereby placing IRS employees and taxpayers at risk.

As noted previously, NTEU members have long voiced concern over the inconsistency of safety and security measures at IRS facilities across the county, and data from TIGTA, which is

charged with investigating threats and assaults against IRS personnel, show that IRS workers are among the most targeted group of federal employees due to the nature of their work, which often requires close interaction with the public. According to TIGTA, it received more than 8,600

threat-related complaints between 2009 and 2012, and “physical violence, harassment, and intimidation of IRS employees continue to pose significant challenges to the implementation of a fair and effective system of tax administration.” Concern over the safety and security of IRS employees led TIGTA to name it as the most serious management and performance challenge facing the IRS.

The absence of adequate security at IRS locations is just one of many security related concerns reported by NTEU members in recent years, which also include: IRS taxpayer walk-in centers without metal detectors, or operational, monitored security cameras; insufficient perimeter lighting; inoperable security equipment; parking areas without security camera coverage; security service spread thin by guards required to leave their posts and patrol loading docks during deliveries; security devices ordered but uninstalled due to inadequate funding; malfunctioning security cameras, security gates and magnetometers; IRS walk-in centers with only cipher locks on the front doors; open loading docks without a security presence; excessive waits for security personnel arrival after making an emergency call; security cameras discovered to not have film after a robbery; and inoperable fire alarms.

NTEU RECOMMENDATIONS

In an effort to help IRS minimize the threat of violence against IRS employees as they administer the Internal Revenue Code, NTEU proposes the following recommendations:

(1) IRS undertake a comprehensive review of safety and security measures at all IRS facilities; (2) ensure IRS employees have access to any and all information on those individuals that could pose a threat; (3) grant law enforcement officer (LEO) status to IRS Revenue Officers.

Mr. Chairman, NTEU great appreciates the opportunity to provide our comments on federal employee workplace safety and security issues and stands ready to work with the Committee to ensure the dedicated federal workforce is protected as they carry out their duties on behalf of the American public.